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THE NEW LEVIATHAN

Dennis Patterson*
THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY. By Philip Bobbitt. New York: Knopf. 2002. Pp. xxxii, 919.

$40.00.
Good is an empty space into which human choice may move.

- Iris Murdoch1

Reputation in any field is an elusive phenomenon: part notoriety,
part honor, part fame, part critical assessment.2 Even in legal scholar
ship it has an uneven, unpredictable quality. It is hard to imagine a
book by a law professor that has had more immediate impact on world
leaders than Philip Bobbitt's The Shield of Achilles.3 Much of the
national-security strategy devised by the U.S. administration after the
September 11 attacks expresses ideas Bobbitt conceived long before;4

*
Distinguished Professor, School of Law (Camden) and Department of Philosophy
(New Brunswick), Rutgers University; Visiting Fellow (2002-03), Department of Politics
(Madison Program), Princeton University. J.D., Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1980, University at Buf
falo, State U niversity of New York - Ed. Thanks to Ari Afilalo, Michael Carrier, Anne
Dalesandro, Mary Eckhardt, Kim Ferzan, Richard Hyland, Michael Livingston, Tom
Morawetz, Andrew Moravcsik, Patrick S. O'Donnell, Ralf Poscher, Rand Rosenblatt, Ray
Solomon, and Jefferson White for generous and helpful comments on drafts of this Review.
Special thanks to Ron Collins. Thanks also to my research assistants, Alyson Jones and
Daniella Gordon.

1. IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 97 (1970).
2. Consider: In 1940, with his reputation in eclipse, Scott Fitzgerald died in Los Angeles.
The poet Stephen Vincent Benet wrote an appreciation, which ended: "You can take off
your hats now, gentlemen, and I think perhaps you had better. This is not a legend, this is a
reputation - and, seen in perspective, it may well be one of the most secure reputations of
our time." Stephen Vincent Benet, Fitzgerald's Unfinished Symphony, 24 SATURDAY REV.
LITERATURE, Dec. 6, 1941, at 10 (book review).
3. Professor of Law, U niversity of Texas Law School.
4. The White House writes:
Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the
Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past
needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy
networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs
to purchase a single tank.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002),
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html (last visited July 22, 2003).
In Achilles, Bobbitt wrote:

avail

For five centuries, it has taken the resources of a state to destroy another state: only states
could muster the huge revenues, conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions requited

to threaten the survival

of other states. . . . We are entering a period, however, when small
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and from a different point on the political spectrum is the Archbishop
of Canterbury,5 whose televised nationwide address in January explic
itly took the book as its text. The British Foreign Secretary, the E.U.
Commissioner for External Relations, and the international security
advisor to the Secretary General of the E.U. have all made speeches
that draw on Bobbitt's ideas.6 In January of 2003, the Guardian news
paper stated that "among [the] powerful, one book has become
required reading."7 This established British liberal voice echoed the
suggestion by the American conservative National Review that "[t]his
book - with its masterly reappraisal of modern history and subtle
el.ucidation of today's geopolitics - should be on every desk in the
State Department,"8 .and its conservative companion the Weekly
Standard recommended that it "should become required reading not
only in the academy but for the military and civilian decision-makers
of the industrialized world."9 For all this, Bobbitt's book is likelier to
have more influence than renown; as with his earlier works, which

numbers of persons, operating with the enormous power of modern computers, biogenetics,
air transport and even small nuclear weapons, can deal lethal blows to any society... . [and]
the origin of these attacks can be effectively disguised . . . . Furthermore, an adversary state
might well want to shield itself from retaliation by operating . . . through shadowy agents
posing as terrorists or acting through the infinitely extendable arms of the Internet.
Pp. xxi, 811-12.
And the White House writes:
As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic opportunity to preserve
the peace. Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the na
tion-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace
instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers find ourselves on the
same side - united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
In Achilles, Bobbitt wrote:

supra.

The September attacks on the US provide that country with an historic opportunity . . . the
moment and the context in which to organize a grand coalition of states . . . .
. . . States that otherwise might find themselves in violent competition can take this opportu
nity to cooperate in a new security structure .. . : all are subject to attacks by a [global ter
rorist network] because [such a network] is the neighbor of all.
Pp. 819, 822.
5. Rowan Williams, Dimbleby Lecture (Dec. 19, 2002) ("This reading of our present
situation is spelled out in great detail by the American strategist and historian Philip Bob
bitt."), available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/sermons_speeches/021219.html
(last visited July 22, 2003).
6. Jack Straw, Lord Mayor's Lecture (Nov. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.britainonline.org.pk/highcomm/downloads/13nov.pdf; Robert Cooper, Grand
Strategy, PROSPECT, Dec. 1, 2002; Chris Patten, Friends Across Water, GUARDIAN, May 18,
2002, at 8 (book review); Prime Minister Rani! Wickremesinghe, Making Our People Rich,
HINDU, (Aug. 25, 2003), available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu//2003/08/25/
stories/2003082501601000.htm.
7. Michael Howard, Best Get Used to War, GUARDIAN, Jan. 13, 2003.
8. Michael Knox Beran, Soldiers of the State, NAT L REV.. Sept. 30, 2002, at 45, 47.
'

9. Fred Siegel,

War Matters,

WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 26-Sept. 2, 2002, at 36-37.
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have reshaped a number of fields, he remains, in the U.S. at least, the
most influential person of whom you have never heard.
Bobbitt's credentials for delivering a work of such far-reaching in
fluence are matched by few scholars. He worked for two decades in
government and academia,10 and has written on topics as diverse as
decision theory,11 nuclear weapons strategy,12 and constitutional
theory.13 He has long been regarded, even by his severest critics, as a
strikingly original thinker.14 Those who look to Achilles for examples
of this originality will not be disappointed. Surprising analysis and dis
cussion abound. Bobbitt shows the relationship between Hans
Kelsen's work15 and Wittgenstein's Tractatus; he offers a theory of the
origin of international law in constitutional law - contrary to that
espoused by Kelsen (pp. 586-92); we are given a new definition of an
old term, the "constitutional order," and Bobbitt describes the term's
unique basis in legitimacy, which he also says accounts for the "specia
tion" of such orders (p. 346; passim ); there is an original monograph
on Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson's trusted friend and advisor (pp.
367-410); and he develops a new application in the area of foreign
policy for social-psychology work done in the late 1960s. All this is in
addition to his novel, central thesis that innovations in warfare and

10. In addition to university teaching in the U.S. and U.K., he has served both Demo
cratic and Republican administrations and has held various posts at the National Security
Council ("NSC"), the Department of State, and the White House, and served as Legal
Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on the Iran-Contra Affair. See
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/pbobbitt/ (last visited July 22, 2003). Until mid-June of
1999, he was the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the NSC. Prior to holding that
post, he was Senior Director for Critical Infrastructure having previously been Director for
Intelligence at the NSC. From 1990-93, Bobbitt was Counselor on International Law for the
Department of State. Id. He was Legal Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on the Iran
Contra Affair (1987) and the principal author of the report, COVERT ACTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION; and Associate Counsel to the President (1980-81). Id.
1 1. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (hereinafter
TRAGIC CHOICES].
12. PHILIP BOBBITT, DEMOCRACY AND DETERRENCE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF
NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1988) (hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND DETERRENCE]; US NUCLEAR
STRATEGY: A READER (Philip Bobbitt et al. eds., 1988).
13. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1984)
[hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE];
PHILIP
BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (I 991) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION].
1 4. See Mark Tushnet, Justification
1707, 1707 (1994).

in Constitutional Adjudication,

72 TEXAS L. REV.

Roughly speaking, scholars of constitutional law fall into two groups. First there are the
celebrated scholars who either restate approaches taken by an earlier generation . . . or re
package ideas developed by other scholars . . . . Then there are original scholars. Philip Bob
bitt is an original scholar. Thus my dichotomy suggests that the insights in his work are likely
to be ignored or transformed by the larger scholarly community.
Id.

1 5. P. 873 n.34 (citing Hans Kelsen,
AND THE INDIVIDUAL 210, 239 (1937)).

Centralization and Decentralization, in AUTHORITY
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revolutions in the constitutional order interact such that neither occurs
without fundamentally affecting the other - with all its implications
for our current constitutional system.
There is a complex sensibility at work in Achilles16 consistent with
that displayed in Bobbitt's previous works. It takes a certain cast of
mind and temperament to go against the grain of received opinion. In
every subject to which he has turned his attention, Bobbitt puts in
question the terms of debate and recasts the discussion. It is this qual
ity of mind that makes all his work - but especially Achilles - so
instructive.
The simplest explanation for the wide interest in Achilles is the
degree to which recent events fall in line with a scenario that was envi
sioned by Bobbitt years before they unfolded in New York, Washing
ton, and the skies over Western Pennsylvania.17 Many said the world
changed that hellish day. If Bobbitt is right, the world had already
changed: September 11 was but a wakeup call.
Achilles opens with this statement of prologue:
We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern
statecraft must change. For five centuries it has taken the resources of a
state to destroy another state: only states could muster the huge reve
nues, conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to
threaten the survival of other states. Indeed, posing such threats, and
meeting them, created the modern state. In such a world, every state

16. Achilles is composed of two Books. In Book I ("State of War"), Bobbitt makes three
arguments. First is the thesis of the Long War, the epochal war of the twentieth century.
Second, Bobbitt employs the concept of an "epochal war" to describe the evolution of the
State over the course of the last five hundred years. The third argument is that we are en
tering a period where the constitutional order will be altered by new forms of warfare. The
main themes of Book I are the relationship of law to strategy, the definition of a constitu
tional order, the idea of a market-state, and the notion of an epochal war. Book II ("States
of Peace") describes the "society of states" about which Bobbitt also makes three argu
ments. First, the constitution of the present society of states was written at Versailles and is
incapable of coping with twenty-first century challenges. Second, constitutions for the soci
ety of states are always written at peace conferences, which occur at the end of epochal wars.
Finally, a society of market-states has multiple futures. Bobbitt explores three possible fu
tures for the society of market-states. The book concludes with a poignant and moving Post
script, written after the events of September 1 1 . Interspersed throughout the book are eight
een poems, including works by Homer, Philip Larkin, W.H. Auden, Joseph Brodsky, John
Milton, Wislawa Szymborska, and two by Czeslaw Milosz, a favorite. See Philip Bobbitt,
Philip Bobbi/l's Favourite Books on International Affairs, GUARDIAN (noting Milosz as one
of Bobbitt's favorite authors), available at http://books.guardian.co.uk/toplOs/topl0/0,6109,
743857,00.html (last visited July 1 0, 2003).
1 7. Edward Rothstein,

Seeing the New Era Before 911 I, N.Y.

TIMES, June 1 , 2002, at B9.

[N)o one could have guessed at the kinds of traumas and transformations that were about to
unfold [after September 11th). But judging from this book - which after a decade of work,
must have been all but complete at the time - the historian Philip Bobbitt had a pretty good
idea .

. . . Mr.

Bobbitt's evolutionary map of warfare's impact

on

the state foreshadows the

kinds of events still unfolding. What has happened since - even last week's announcement
that Russia is now affiliated with its onetime nemesis, NATO - fits eerily well with his
speculations.

Id.
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knew that its enemy would be drawn from a small class of potential ad
versaries. This is no longer true, owing to advances in international tele
communications, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction.
The changes in statecraft that will accompany these developments will be
as profound as any that the State has thus far undergone. (p. xxi )

The persuasiveness of Bobbitt's thesis - that the State as we know
it is undergoing a fundamental transformation - is given convincing
support by his analysis of the entire history of the modern State in
relation to five "epochal wars" which give rise to five different consti
tutional orders. His analysis of the State's legitimacy and legitimation
is "topological"; constant among the five changes in the constitutional
order is an interplay between strategy, law, and history.18 This inter
play has determined legitimacy over the course of the last five
hundred years, periodically resulting in the demise of one form of the
State and the institution of a new one.19 As each epochal war is con
cluded,20 legitimacy is real.ized by the triumphant new constitutional
order21 and is then ratified at a peace conference that settles the con
stitutional form for the newly constituted society of states. The ques
tion for our time is: What war - and what peace - will someday be
seen as having accomplished the same sort of fundamental change in
the constitution of contemporary international society by legitimizing
the market-state?" (p. 484), which Bobbitt sees as the new emerging
constitutional order.
18. In his view, "there is no State without strategy, Jaw and history, and . . . these three
are not merely interrelated elements, they are elements each composed . . . of the other[)."
P. 6.
19. The Princely State ( 1 51 5-1555) provides an example,
of a strategic imperative animating a constitutional innovation - an instance, that is, where
the insistent question of security in a specific context (geography, wealth, small population)
yields a new legal solution and requires a story to rationalize that solution. If the constitu. tional innovation of the Modern State was in part a response to the threat posed by mobile
artillery to the walled cities of Italy, the precise shape of that response - the princely state
- was not governed by strategic considerations alone. but also by the felt need to ensure le
gitimacy for the leadership that wedded its future to this new creation.
P. 83.
20. Five forms of the State and their accompanying epochal wars mark the metamor
phoses of the State: Princely State (Habsburg-Valois Wars) 1 5 1 5- 1 555; Kingly State (Thirty
Years' War) 161 8-1648; Territorial State (Wars of Louis XIV) 1667-1713; State-Nation
(Wars of the French Revolution) 1792-1815; Nation-State (The Long War) 1914-1990.
P. 346.
21. The legitimacy of the State has been the subject of philosophical speculation since
antiquity. Legitimacy - the right of the State to command allegiance and exercise a monop
oly on violence - is conventionally tied to sovereignty. Nowhere is this more evident than
modernity where the first great theorist of the state - Hobbes - grounded the allegiance of
individuals to the State in an irrevocable covenant between the State and its citizens. Bobbitt
eschews a pure philosophical approach to the question of legitimacy and shows that legiti
macy is best thought of as an historical achievement; a unique fusion of strategy and law.
This is why bringing strategy together with statecraft and law marks a development in the
theory of legitimacy. As Bobbitt puts it, "history is the medium by which the legitimacy of
the constitutional structure is married to the success of the strategy of the state." P. 207.
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The last constitutional order achieved victory over its competitors
in 1990, after the most recent epochal war that Bobbitt denominates
the "Long War."22 This ended with the demise of fascism and commu
nism and the triumph of parliamentary democracy. Shortly after the
collapse of the former Soviet Union, some claimed that with the
triumph of democracy the history of the State ended.23 Bobbitt thinks
otherwise. It was the history of the nation-state that ended. The legiti
macy of the current constitutional order - the nation-state - is in
irreversible decline. But the nation-state is only the most recent consti
tutional order. Bobbitt is clear that the State will not go away, but its
nature will change so thoroughly that its statecraft will be rendered
obsolete.24 Nation-states will be replaced by market-states,25 and
changes in the nature of the State will be accompanied by new forms
22. The "Long War" encompassed World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Spanish
Civil War, the Second World War, the Korean and Viet Nam wars, and the Cold War. One
of the most thoughtful commentators on Achilles is Paul Hirst. He takes issue with Bobbitt's
Long War thesis. See Paul Hirst, Hirst on Bobbitt, OPEN DEMOCRACY, JULY 7, 2002, at
http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=3&debateld=77&articleld=690 ("The
long war only makes sense if, as Bobbitt claims, Germany was a fascist power before World
War One - bent on world domination and controlled by an authoritarian regime."). For
criticism of Bobbitt's account of the collapse of the Weimar Republic, see Gopal Balakrish
nan. Algorithms of War, NEW LEFf REV., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 5, 1 8-20 (reviewing The Shield
of Achilles).

23. This thesis is advanced in FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE
LAST MAN (1993). Bobbitt points out that Hegel made exactly the same sort of "end of
history" claim for the state-nation at about the moment when its founding history was
achieving consensus. See p. 215 n. Additionally, "Fukuyama got the end of ideology right,
but he missed the resurgence of nationalism. He missed Islamic fundamentalism. He imag
ined that the end of the ideological world of the 20th century would bring a sort of stasis."
Philip Bobbitt, Bobbitt on Bobbitt, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1 1 , 2002, at http://www.open
democracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=3&debateld=77&articleld=733 (last visited Sept. 18,
2003).
24. An interesting approach to the changing nature of the State - one which echoes
themes in Bobbitt's argument - can be found in Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State, in
RE-ORDERING THE WORLD 1 1 (Mark Leonard ed., 2002) (comparing states in the modern
and "postmodern" worlds along the lines of war, security, and statecraft). In his much
discussed article Power and Weakness (now the book ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND
POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003)), Robert Kagan places
Cooper's postmodern Europe in the larger context of U.S. power and global (especially
European) security. See KAGAN, supra, at 74.
"The challenge to the postmodern world," Cooper argues. "is to get used to the idea of dou
ble standards." Among themselves, Europeans may "operate on the basis of laws and open
cooperative security." But when dealing with the world outside Europe, "we need to revert
to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pn:emptive attack, deception, whatever is
necessary." This is Cooper's principle for safeguarding society: "Among ourselves, we keep
the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle."·
(internal citation omitted). This state of affairs is not without difficulties. According to
Kagan, the United States must "play by the rules of a Hobbesian world . . . [here] it must
sometimes act unilaterally, not out of a passion for unilateralism but only because, given a
weak Europe that has moved beyond power, the United States has no choice but to act uni
laterally." Id. at 99.
Id.

25. I discuss three possible versions of the market-state.
companying text.

See infra

notes 34-35 and ac
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of warfare.26 War is an inevitable feature of human existence, Bobbitt
argues.27 We cannot change this fact but we can, with careful planning,
choose our wars.28
Why is the legitimacy of the nation-state in decline, and why does
Bobbitt believe the market-state will take its place? To see this, one
must appreciate the basis for legitimacy in both these forms, for that is
what distinguishes constitutional orders from each other. The nation
state promised to improve the material well-being of its nation and
made this promise its raison d'etre. Bobbitt identifies five develop
ments that will make this promise increasingly difficult to fulfill. First
is an international system of trade and finance that promotes
exchanges of goods, and talent, and the free movement of capital.29 As
capital moves from place to place around the globe, seeking the high-

26. Al Qaeda illustrates this development. Bobbitt sees Al Qaeda not as a rogue gang
but a malignant form of market-state:
The multinational mercenary terror network that Osama bin Laden .and others have as
sembled is a malignant and mutated version of the market-state. Like other emerging mar..ket-states, it is a reaction to the strategic developments of the Long War that brought forth
cultural penetration, the liberalization of trade and finance, and weapons proliferation, on
an unprecedented scale. Like other states, this network has a standing army; it has a treasury
and a consistent source of revenue; it has a permanent civil service; it has an intelligence
collection and analysis cadre; it even runs a rudimentary welfare program for its fighters, and
their relatives and associates. It has a recognizable hierarchy of officials; it makes alliances
with other states; it promulgates laws, which it enforces ruthlessly; it declares wars.
This network, of which Al Qaeda is only a part, greatly resembles a multinational corpo
ration but that is simply to say that it is a market-state, made possible by advances in interna
tional telecommunications and transit, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction.
Lacking contiguous territory, Al Qaeda is a kind of virtual state, which means that our clas
sical strategies of deterrence based on retaliation will have to be rethought. That is another
way of saying that when Afghanistan is conquered and pacified, the war against terrorism
will go on. P. 820.
27. War, Bobbitt writes,
is not a pathology that, with proper hygiene and treatment, can be wholly prevented. War is
a natural condition of the State, which was organized in order to be an effective instrument
of violence on behalf of society. Wars are like deaths, which, while they can be postponed,
will come when they come and cannot be finally avoided.
P. 819 (emphasis omitted).
28. In this regard, Bobbitt describes our choices this way:
The epochal war we are about to enter will either be a series of low-intensity, information
guided wars linked by a commitment to re-inforcing world order, or a gradually increasing
anarchy that leads to intervention at a much costlier level or even a cataclysm of global pro
portions preceded by a period of relative if deceptive peace. It is ours to choose.
P. 342.
29. One harbinger of the transition to the market-state is the phenomenon of "globaliza
tion." P.469 ("[G]lobalization has undermined the collectivist values represented by the na
tion-state and turned attention to the benefit of individuals."). Globalization acts as a cata
.lyst in "[t] he real shift . . . from public purposes to private purposes, from a state that takes
its legitimacy by assuring the common welfare to one that instead relies on providing the
broadest possible opportunity for the satisfaction of individual interests." P. 470. For Bob
bitt, "globalization" is merely an epiphenomenon of deeper developments; not a fundamen
tal driver but a symptom.
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est return, financial markets and national currencies are subject to
violent upset, removing from the nation-state the power to control the
value of its currency.30 Second are threats that do not observe national
boundaries. Examples of these are environmental threats and diseases
such as AIDS and SARS. No nation-state alone can protect its nation
or hide from these transnational threats. Third are threats to the
national culture. We often hear that with the advent of the Internet
came a world culture. It is a fairly safe bet that no nation-state can
limit or meaningfully control citizen access to foreign cultures. The
fourth development is one of which we need no reminder - weapons
of mass destruction. Like the threat posed by mobile artillery to the
walled cities of fifteenth-century Italy,31 the ballistic missile, the suit
case bomb, and chemical and biological weapons are engendering a
new constitutional order. These weapons of mass destruction make it
impossible to defend the nation by defending the perimeters of the
nation-state. As a result of this development and the increasing disper
sion of this technology, no nation-state can promise to increase the
security of the nation by increasing its offensive capabilities: at most it
can decrease its vulnerability. Fifth, and of particular importance, is
international law32 and the global system of human rights,33 which

30. George Soros, who has profited (and lost) mightily wagering against currencies, has
written three books arguing for reform of global markets. See GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS
OP GLOBAL CAPITALISM: OPEN SOCIETY ENDANGERED (1998); GEORGE SOROS, ON
GLOBALIZATION (2002); GEORGE SOROS, OPEN SOCIETY: REFORMING GLOBAL
CAPITALISM (2000).
31. P. 80 ("Machiavelli, writing in 1 519, said that after 1494, '[n]o wall exists, however
thick, that artillery cannot destroy in a few days.' Suddenly, walls, towers, moats - all were
rendered obsolete.'' (internal citation omitted)).
32. There are conceptual problems with the current approach (the "universal view") to
international law:

The universal view of international law is flawed in two important respects (neither having
much to do, however, with the common criticism that such universal scope must await a uni
versal morality). First, it mixes the equality of states, a legal concept, with the decision to use
force, a strategic concept, in a way that is fatal to both, and thus eerily recapitulates the early
prehistory of the State, which was first constituted out of the separation of these two con
cepts. Thus it treats the society of states as if it were a society of individuals.
P. 361 .
33. The United Nations, Bobbitt argues, is part of the problem.
The U.N., a second generation of the League [of Nations], has given us a second generation
of .. . failures, that is, a new wave of crimes shielded by sovereignty ....

... It is instructive . . . to look closely at how the U.N. has actually managed to succeed
when it has acted to wage war. It may surprise some to learn that its successes have come
only because the ideal of a world covenant enforced by a military force has been quickly, if
quietly, abandoned.
P. 472 (discussing the U.N. Security Council's handling of the North Korean attack on South
Korea).
According to Bobbitt, this will lead to the delegitimation of the U.N.:

Though the Charter, interpreted as a world covenant of superior Jaw. has been of doubtful
utility in preventing armed conflict, its most troublesome aspect may lie in peacetime. Very
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impose legal rules on the nation that have not been ratified by the
nation-state. But the State will not wither away under these pressures.
Rather, the basis of its legitimacy will change. Market-states will claim
power on the grounds that they are the means by which opportunity is
maximized.34 In the future, our statecraft "must reflect the emergence

simply, it is not obvious that a universal law-creating system actually based on democratic
majoritarianism and self-determination is either acceptable or desirable. Nor is the U.N.
wholly consistent with such a system in any event, owing to the privileged role of the perma
nent, veto-bearing members of the Security Council. Yet a universal system that professes
allegiance to the sources of authority of the parliamentary nation-state but denies them in
fact is of doubtful legitimacy.
Pp. 474-75.
And what will take the place of the U. N.?
When it is replaced by a constitution for a society of market-states, this problem will disap
pear because that constitution will resemble those of corporations. which allow for weighted
voting based on wealth. But to adopt such a constitution, we will have to abandon the pre
tense of a world sovereign: corporations, after all, do not make law.
P. 475.
There is, perhaps, no finer example of the U.N.'s continuing inability to solve security
crises than its handling of Saddam Hussein. Bobbitt writes:
Saddam Hussein has spent the last twelve years breaching every provision of the Ceasefire
Agreement that ended the Gulf War. Though required to "unconditionally accept" disar
mament of his weapons of mass destruction under U N supervision, he has actively sought to
acquire such weapons , expelled the inspectors and hidden the WMD he already had. After
the defection of the head of his biological weapons program in 1995, Saddam Hussein was
compelled to acknowledge that he had produced no fewer than 183 biological weapons in
violation of the Agreement. Since 1998, he has repeatedly attempted to acquire weapons
grade uranium. He has replaced the original design for a nuclear warhead with a new design
that could accommodate a Scud missile. Nine such missiles are still unaccounted for in the
Iraqi inventory.
When Saddam Hussein attacked the unprotected Kurds in violation of the Agreement. the
Coalition should have acted , immediately and decisively. But for the same reasons one hears
now - concern about post-Saddam governance, anxiety among local allies over domestic
reaction, fear of retaliation - the US could not marshal support for action at that time or at
any time during the following decade in which Saddam Hussein flagrantly violated the
Agreement that had allowed him to maintain his dictatorial power over Iraq. Indeed the US
was barely able to keep the sanctions in place even after Saddam had threatened and ex
pelled the inspectors. During those years. nothing changed - until 11 September 2001. What
happened on that day had little to do with Iraq - but a great deal to do with the willingness
to respond to the ongoing situation in Iraq.
So those who are looking for a "smoking gun," or for something new in Saddam Hussein's
behavior that would compel us to act now, or for some link between al-Qaida and Iraq in or
der to justify a change of regime by force are looking in the wrong place. It is not new evi
dence that is driving the response now: I for one pray he hasn't been able to get nuclear
weapons, despite his best efforts. Rather there is a new resolve, and a new urgency.
Philip Bobbitt, Time to Act, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Jan. 12, 2003, at http://www.open
democracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2 &debateld=88&articleld=882#11; see also Philip
Bobbitt, Today's War ls Against Tomorrow's Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at Al9 (dis
cussing the question of militaryaction in Iraq in the light of "Parmenides' Fallacy").
34. Bobbitt sees one option of the E.U.
attempt to cling to the nation-state:

-

the super-state option - as a pathetic

It is a failure of imagination . . . to assume that the only thing that will replace the nation
state is another structure with nation-state-like characteristics, only larger. It is in some ways
rather pathetic that the visionaries in Brussels can imagine nothing more forward-looking
than equipping the E.U. with the trappings of the nation-state.
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of a society of market-states in which law and strategy have begun to
merge - where war often looks like crime and vice-versa, where
borders have less to do with defining the State than do more intangi
ble perimeters like language and technological compatibility"(p. 354).
What will life be like in the market-state? The legitimating premise
of the market-state is the maximization of opportunities enjoyed by
members of society. The market-state uses market incentives to a far
greater degree than the nation-state, preferring economic incentives to
the nation-state's reliance on legal regulation. The market-state rec
ognizes no distinctions of class and is "indifferent to race and ethnicity
and gender . . . ." (p. 230). In matters of justice, the market-state is
agnostic: any conception of justice is fine, so long as it "does not act as
an impediment to economic competition" (p. 230). Opportunity, effi
ciency, and consumer choice are the central organizing features of the
market-state.
Just as the parliamentary nation-state emerged from three possi
bilities for that constitutional order, so too will the market-state offer
several variations. The first possibility is an entrepreneurial market
state (Bobbitt calls a society of such states "The Meadow"). Under this
model, deregulation and privatization are key features of government.
These go hand in hand with other policies, which include reduced
rates of taxation, lower welfare benefits, free trade, and relaxed immi
gration rules. Security issues are likely to be a paramount concern.
Life in The Meadow might be best characterized as a permanent state
of impermanence when it comes to questions of government policy, as
ad hoc decisionmaking replaces broad and long-range policy agendas.
A society of states following the second model of the mercantile
market-state, "The Garden," is more concerned with supporting indus
try and preserving national and cultural identity. In The Garden,
strong alliances are forged between government and industry - capi
tal rather than labor is the focus of domestic fiscal policy. Protection
ism has a place as well. In matters of culture, ethnic homogeneity and
welfare are core values. These policies, Bobbitt speculates, will lead to
less international cooperation between states on matters of security
and, alarmingly, the proliferation of nuclear and other forms of
weaponry.
Lastly is "The Park," devoted to managerial market-states. Life in
The Park is a high-maintenance affair, akin to contemporary life in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The economy will be slow to innovate
and grow: economic efficiency will be sacrificed in favor of social
cohesion and equality. Aggravating this situation will be continuing
resistance to liberalization of labor markets in order to protect high
wage jobs. This could end with no high-wage jobs to protect, but

P. 234.
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managerial market-states are more concerned with the quality of life
. than with growth (entrepreneurial) or market-share (mercantile).35
The market-state is not a market, and whatever form of govern
ance develops will entail a diminishing supply of "public goods."
Doubtless there will be continuing support of institutions without
which the market cannot function effectively; tangible and intangible
infrastructure (e.g., education and health) will be even more important
to the market-state than the nation-state. Nevertheless, market-states
will have inherent, but unavoidable, weaknesses: among them a lack of
community, extreme meritocracy, "essential materialism and indiffer
ence to heroism, spirituality, and tradition" (p. 290). To combat these
shortcomings, some public goods must come from another source.
From where will such goods come?
This precise question was raised by the Archbishop of Canterbury
who, in a nationally televised speech, suggested that we are living in a
transitional period, "where the basic assumptions about how states
work are shifting."36 Taking The Shield of Achilles as his starting point,
the Archbishop stated that, in his view, "we are witnessing the end of
the nation state, and the nation state is being replaced in the economi
cally developed world by what some call the 'market state.' "37
The Archbishop's televised address was met with considerable
comment and some criticism. Most critics focused on the Archbishop's
remarks about the State,38 misunderstanding him to be saying that the
State is withering away. Bobbitt entered the fray and offered a defense
of the position, answering critics who missed the most important point
in the Archbishop's speech: the need for nonstate enterprises to
provide the public goods no longer nourished by the State.39
35. David Runciman ties together the problematic aspects of international security and
Bobbitt's three possible futures for the market-state. See David Runciman, The Garden, the
Park and the Meadow, LONDON REV. BOOKS, June 6, 200 2, at 7-8.
·

Bobbitt wants to remind us that in a world of states like ours the greatest dangers remain the
confrontations between the most powerful states, though these in turn should not blind us to
the possibility of allowing small-scale disputes to escalate into the kind of conflicts that
overwhelm us. Because this is a world of states, the choice is not between war and peace, but
between wars that we have anticipated and can manage, and wars that we haven't and can't.
36. Williams, supra note 5.
37. Id.

at 2.

38. On this point, the Archbishop stated:
This new form of political administration has in some ways crept up on us, and we need to
do some hard thinking about how it has happened and what changes are involved for the
whole idea of being a citizen - not to mention the whole idea of being a politician too. And
if the analysis I want to offer is right, and these changes are indeed irreversible, we need to
look at what kind of vacuum is left in our social imagination as a result.
Id.

39. Bobbitt wrote:
The state is not going away, and in some respects it will be more powerful than ever. Nor
does the nation state have a monopoly on nationalism; far earlier constitutional orders re
flected intense nationalism. Rather , Dr. Williams is arguing that the emergence of the mar-
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And what of war? Can we hope that the market-state will usher in
a new state of peace? Constrained by his reading of historical
evidence, Bobbitt offers no comfort here. War is a constitutive feature
of politics:
There is a widespread view that war is simply a pathology of the State,
and that healthy states will not fight wars. This view ignores the role
strategy plays in the formation and continuance of states. War, like law,
sustains the State by giving it the means to carry out its purposes of pro
tection, preservation, and defense.40

In a Postscript to Achilles, Bobbitt speaks of the attacks on New
York and Washington from the point of view of one who had, for
some time, anticipated such events. He writes:
For five centuries only a state could destroy another state. And for five
centuries, states have developed means of defeating other states. Entire
worlds of diplomacy, international law, alliances, and naval, air, and land
warfare are all predicated upon conflicts among states. Only states could
marshal the resources to threaten the survival of other states; only states
could organize societies to defend themselves against such threats. Only
states could bring about peace congresses.
We are entering a period, however, when very small numbers of persons,
operating with the enormous power of modern computers, biogenetics,
air transport, and even small nuclear weapons, can deal lethal blows to

ket state will see the state evacuate areas of responsibility that it had, in the last 150 years,
undertaken. When the Left argues for affirmative action, and the Right for criminalising
abortion; when the Left wants to make hate speech a crime and the Right wants to crimi
nalise drug use; when the Left seeks to create "hate crimes" and the Right wants to ban non
national languages: all are regarding the state as a nation-state, employing law and regula
tion to enforce moral positions. But when the Left urges the deregulation of reproductive
choice, and the Right the deregulation of industry, they have moved to a market-state per
spective. Phenomena such as the replacement of conscription with an all-volunteer force,
welfare reform that attempts to replace unemployment allowances with education and
training to help the unemployed to enter the labour market, and the use of non
governmental organisations and private companies as adjuncts to traditional government ac
tivities, reflect elements of the barely emerging market state.
And this is the Archbishop's point: that a state that is, owing to these new forces, relatively
(compared to the nation-state) indifferent to loyalty, civility, trust in authority, respect for
family life, regard for privacy, reverence for sacrifice, equality and solidarity will require that
the society it governs promotes these qualities through non-state agencies. As the Arch
bishop put it: "It is inevitable that governments can no longer deliver in terms of setting out
a moral basis in law - other institutions will have to take up a new role." This is why he fo
cuses on "the willingness of the market-state government to engage with traditional religious
communities in a new way."
Philip Bobbitt, The Archbishop Is Right: The Nation-State Is Dying, TIMES (LONDON), Dec.

27, 2002,

available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/pbobbitt/shieldofachilles/archbishop.

html.

40.

P.

780. Bobbitt goes further,

asserting that looking at war as a pathology

disables us from shaping future wars, as we search, fruitlessly, for the wonder serum that will
banish war once and for all (or as we plan to fight wars we know - or believe - we can
win). Yet we can shape future wars, even if we cannot avoid them. We can take decisions
that will determine whether the next epochal war risks a general cataclysm.
P. xxvii.
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any society. Because the origin of these attacks can be effectively dis
guised, the fundamental bases of the State will change.

(p. 811)

The Long War, which established the strongest model of the
nation-state, was won with three innovations: weapons of mass
destruction,41 globalized communications, and international integra
tion of finance and trade (p. 713). It is a bitter irony that these very
developments now threaten the peace achieved by the conclusion of
the Long War. If we are to find our way in what Bobbitt calls a "new
age of indeterminacy" (p. 816) we must realize that we cannot meet
the demands of this new age with the nation-state's tools (including
the international institutions).42
I mentioned at the outset that Achilles exhibits habits of mind and
temperament unusual in the academy today. The frame of mind
exemplified in Achilles also finds expression in Bobbitt's earlier work.
For example, in Achilles Bobbitt offers us a method of scenario plan
ning that is crucially different from the model widely used by corpora
tions.43 Bobbitt's model eschews the four matrix design of the classic
prisoner's dilemma,44 which has an optimal decision point, in favor of
holding all facts constant across the scenario suite, varying only for
human decisions at particular crossroads and offering largely incom
mensurable - but not incomparable - outcomes. This adamant re
fusal to select an optimal point derives directly from Tragic Choices. 45
41. Bobbitt argues that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan was necessary to win
the peace.
I have never been persuaded of the moral position of those who would have urged continued
nonnuclear bombing of the Japanese people for an extended period of months, accepting
also the American casualties that would have ensued in such an invasion, as preferable to the
atomic attacks on the two Japanese cities. The only alternative to this carnage would have
been a half-life for fascism, in

a kind of negotiated twilight. And that

is precisely what the

Long War was fought to eliminate.

P. 678.
42. One example is the conduct of future wars.
If we wish to avoid cataclysmic war and invisible, silent war, we shall have to learn how to
wage wars like the ones in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, using the tactics of relentless air
strikes, special forces teams, and indigenous allies. This means, pre-eminently, that we shall
have to develop rules for intervention. Out of this new epochal conflict can come, some day,
the consensus that will provide the basis for a constitution for the society of the new form of
the state.

P. 782.
43. See GILL RINGLAND, SCENARIO PLANNING: MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE (1998).
Bobbitt's model is more akin to that pioneered by Royal D utch Shell Corporation. See
SHELL INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM Co., GLOBAL SCENARIOS 1992-2020, at 2 (1992) (pre
ferring comparison of alternative scenarios to reliance on forecasts or predictions), available
at http://www.shell.com/static/royal-en/downloads/globalscenarios_l992_2020_partl.pdf.
44. For discussion, see Stephen Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2001), available at http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/ (last visited July 22, 2003).
45. See TRAGIC CHOICES, supra note 1 L at 17-28 (describing the methodological ap
proach of mixing allocation methodologies).

1728

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

101:1715

Bobbitt also gives us an alternative to the economic determinism
so evident in Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.46
As Richard Overy observes, "[m]uch of The Shield of Achilles is
devoted to demonstrating that the modern age really has been shaped
by war and law, which flies defiantly and deliberately in the face of a
century of Marxist and sub-Marxist belief in the historical force of
class conflict and systems of production."47 In Achilles, Bobbitt offers
an account of decisionmaking diametrically opposed to deterministic
modes of explanation so prevalent in the social sciences. Democracy
and Deterrence also asserted that economic factors were not funda
mental drivers of nuclear strategy and that constrained choices could
nevertheless be crucial.to outcomes.48 In Democracy and Deterrence,
Bobbitt argued that, contrary to conventional understanding, "ex
tended deterrence" (the protection of Germany and Japan) and not
"central deterrence" (the protection of the American homeland) had
driven the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy.49
Constitutional Fate, Bobbitt's first book on constitutional theory,
presented a fresh approach to the jurisprudence of constitutional law.so
There, Bobbitt described six forms of constitutional argument.s1 Like
Democracy and Deterrence, this book's thesis turned things upside
down. Against the grain of the entire academic debate over the legiti
macy of judicial review, Bobbitt demonstrated that nothing "grounds"
our constitutional practices, and that efforts to do so create artificial
problems that, when the debate is understood, simply go away or are
dissolved. The search for foundations was, he argued, simply without

46.

PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS ( 1989) .

47.

Richard Overy,

48.

DEMOCRACY AND DETERRENCE,

49. Id.

at Book I

The New Leviathan?,

LITERARY REV., July

supra note 12,

2002,

at

23.

at 3-6.

passim.

50. Many commentators on the book misunderstood Bobbitt's argument. One reviewer
dismissed it, concluding that "Bobbitt never adequately provides an underlying structure
that ties his assertions to the other portions of his analysis to form a coherent theory of judi
cial review." Martin Redish, Judicial Review and Constitutional Ethics, 82 MICH. L. REV.
665, 679 ( 1984) (reviewing CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 13) . The irony is that one
could read Constitutional Fate and fail to realize that not only was Bobbitt not advancing a
new theory of judicial review, he was arguing that the entire debate over the legitimacy of
judicial review is a pointless enterprise. This misunderstanding continues. But see GUYORA
BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 166-69 ( 2000) (elaborating
upon Bobbitt's critique of the problematic presuppositions of the debate over the legitimacy
of judicial review).
51. The six forms of argument are: historical (relying on the intentions of the Framers
and rati�iers of the Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Consti
tution alone, as they would be understood by the average contemporary "man on the
street"); structural (inferring rules from relationships that the Constitution mandates among
the structures it sets up); doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving
rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Consti
tution); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule). See
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 13, at 3-136.
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foundation. The only legitimacy our constitutional practice can have,
or needs to have, is in the continued employment of the forms of legal
argument to show the truth and falsity of propositions of constitu
tional law. Like Tragic Choices, Constitutional Fate is highly influen
tial: there can scarcely be a law school where the forms of argument
are not now self-consciously taught.52 Casebooks and judicial opinions
frequently speak of "structural" or "prudential" arguments as Bobbitt
described them, or distinguish between historical and textual argu
ments in the way he taught us, even if the source of these ideas is not
always apparent.53
In Constitutional Interpretation, Bobbitt developed a more capa
cious view of constitutional decisionmaking.54 There he took the forms
of legal argument, now referred to as "modalities,"55 beyond the
confines of judicial argument; and showed how other governmental
actors, for example the President and the Congress, must employ the
modalities to discharge their constitutional responsibilities,56 whether
it be for purposes of impeachment, war powers, secession, the
purchase of Louisiana, or the confirmation of a judge. His clarification
of our practice of constitutional law also enabled him to show how a
case can be wrongly decided even by the highest authoritative court,
an explicit challenge to Legal Realism, which held that law was what
the highest court declared it to be. More importantly, he demonstrated
that precedent can be legitimately overruled through modal argument.
His position thus posed a challenge both to Legal Positivism and
Dworkinian Constructivism.
In Constitutional Interpretation, Bobbitt wrote: "Every society has
a constitution. . . . the Holy Roman Empire, and the Boy Scouts, la
Cosa Nostra and the Quakers, the inmates of a prison and the local
garden club all have constitutions."57 He gives this idea new applica52. See Akhil Amar, In Praise of Bobbitt, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1 994) ("Bob
bitt's modalities are key tools . . . . ).
"

53. See, e. g. , THOMAS E. BAKER & JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS:
IN A NUTSHELL 307-336 (2003). But see PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (2000) (citing
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 13, and CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra
note 13, and enumerating the modalities).
54. I argued for the general jurisprudential implications of Bobbitt's approach to consti
tutional law in Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270
(1 993) (reviewing CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 13). I show how the mo
dalities are part of a larger jurisprudence of legal argument in DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW
AND TRUTH 170-79 (1996), and Dennis Patterson, Normativity and Objectivity in Law, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 325 (2001 ).
55. For Bobbitt, the modalities are neither true nor false: they are the means by which
lawyers show the truth of propositions of constitutional law.
56. See CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 64-108 (discussing the
Iran-Contra affair and Robert Bork's confirmation hearing to illustrate the various nonjudi
cial uses of the modalities).
57. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 64-108.
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tion, arguing that the society of states has a constitution that achieves
consensus through epochal warmaking and is memorialized in the con
stitutions written by the great congresses that follow such wars.58 This
allows him to argue that the international order is progressively given
greater definition as it draws on the content of a newly established
constitutional order, that is, when a particular form achieves domi
nance.59
Constitutional Fate left an important question unanswered. Given
the possibility that the modalities used to show the truth and falsity of
propositions of constitutional law may conflict, what means do we
have for deciding which modality should prevail? Bobbitt's solution to
the problem of choice posed by modal conflict makes two conceptual
advances: he both solves a theoretical problem in constitutional theory
and, at the same time, constructs a completely original account of
choice in law.
The problem of choice is the occasion for the exercise of the dis
tinctly human faculty of conscience.60 As Bobbitt wrote in Constitu
tional Interpretation: "The recursion to conscience is the crucial activ
ity on which the constitutional system of interpretation . . . depends."61
The system of constitutional interpretation depends on conscience be
cause it is through the exercise of conscience that we show our
values.62 It is by creating a space for conscience - not banishing it in
the face of a particular theory of justice - that a system is just.63

58. P. x. For example, the treaties of Versailles, Utrecht, and Vienna.
59. Bobbitt even sorts out the various schools of contemporary international law into
the "modalities" of constitutional law that he first described in Constitutional Fate. Pp. 66061.
60. Bobbitt discusses conscience in
and Carl Schmitt. P. 596.

Achilles

61. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION,
62.

Id.

in connection with the thought of Hobbes

supra note

13, at 184.

at 183-86.

63. Constilll tional Interpretation is the first account of legal practice from a religious
point of view. The parallel with Wittgenstein's argument in the Tractatus is clear. Wittgen
stein once said "I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view." M. O'C
Drury, Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein, in LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN:
PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS 79 (Rush Rhees ed., 1 984). In the Tractalm, Wittgenstein set
out to describe a certain metaphysical relationship between language and reality. For Witt
genstein, truth is something that is "shown" rather than "said." He regarded the most impor
tant part of his endeavor to be that about which he said almost nothing: the mystical. This is
indicated in the final, cryptic passage: "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in
silence." LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHI LOSOPHICUS 7 (David Pears &
Brian McGuinness trans., 1 961). For Bobbitt, the most important aspect of constitutional
practice is neither how it is conducted (i.e., the modalities) nor our attempts to theorize it.
Rather, the existence of conscience shows God's presence in the world. This is the most sig
nificant dimension of modal conflict (seen from the religious point of view).
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From Tragic Choices to Democracy and Deterrence through
Nuclear Strategy, to two sublime works in constitutional theory64 and
now The Shield of Achilles, Bobbitt has consistently returned to the
same territory (albeit from a variety of vantage points): human
choice.65 Whether it be that of the solitary individual (e.g., a judge
deciding a case) or a nation considering its options in a time of crisis, it
is the defining characteristic of human existence. However one under
stands the meaning of Bobbitt's conception of conscience, it cannot be
a matter of applying a moral calculus or decision procedure of one
kind or another. We do not choose our values; we make choices and,
in doing so, exhibit our values.66 In this sense, choice is the matrix from
which we discover and recreate the ethical.67
Achilles is a brilliant and astonishing book. As the European
Union's Commissioner for External Affairs wrote: "We are all about
to have our way of looking at the world turned upside down by a
superb book."68 To describe Bobbitt's accomplishment, it is tempting
to invoke Bernard Bailyn's insightful definition of "the modern
creative historian" as someone who provides "a whole area of histori
cal investigation by redirecting it from established channels into new
directions, unexplored directions, so that what was once dark, vague
or altogether unperceived is suddenly flooded with light and the
possibilities of a new way of understanding are suddenly revealed."69
Bobbitt has done so with admirable skill and daring.
It will be decades and more before we know the answer to Paul
Kennedy's surmise that "Achilles may . . . become a classic to later

64. When asked by the legal affairs columnist Stuart Taylor to recommend the best
book on judicial review in the last twenty years, Laurence Tribe wrote, "There are two, and
they're both by the same author," recommending Bobbitt's Constitutional Fate, and Consti
tutional Interpretation. E-mail from Stuart Taylor, to Dennis Patterson (Feb. 18, 2003) (on
file with author).
65. In explicitly religious language, Bobbitt wrote: " Decision according to law is an
ideal, but it is also an art and finally it is our piety, our 'service to God.' CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 186, citing and qu oting FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Preface
to Second Edition, THE GAY SCIENCE (2d ed. 1887).
"

66. For Bobbitt, one of these values is faith. He once wrote: "It seems that whenever I
.sat down to write about making decisions, I found I was writing about faith; and when I
wrote about faith, it became something about making decisions.'' Philip Bobbitt, What I
Write, Lecture at the Johnson Library (Jan. 21, 2003) (transcript on file with author).
67. Wittgenstein expresses a similar view. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lecture 011 Ethics,
PHILOSOPHICAL OCCASIONS 37, 38 (James c. Klagge & Alfred Nordmann eds., 1 993)
("Now I am going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider sense, in a sense in fact which
includes what I believe to be the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics.'');
see also S0REN KIERKEGAARD, 1 CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS 33 (Howard v. Hong & Edna H. Hong trans., J 992) ("All de
cision . . . is rooted in subjectivity.'').
in

68. Patten, supra note 6, at 1 .
69. BERNARD BAILYN, HISTORY AND THE CREATIVE I MAGINATION 4 (1985).
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generations."7° For now, we are already assured by none other than Sir
Michael Howard that it will become "[o]ne of the most important
works on international relations [in] the last fifty years."71 But if you
ever wonder what works from our era will be read as The Prince72 or
Leviathan73 are read, think of The Shield ofAchilles. 74

70. Paul Kennedy,

Th e Modern Machiavelli,

N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 7, 2002, at 52, 55.

71 . Michael Howard, Advance Praise (back cover) for Ach illes.
72. Kennedy,
73.

supra

note 70.

See Overy, supra note

47.

74. See Caryl Haskins, Advance Praise (back cover) for HENRY KISSINGER, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1957) (calling it "the work of authentic genius"), which
addressed for the post-World War II generation how statecraft would have to come to terms
with nuclear deterrence.

